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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Ernest Medford and George Csizmazia ("defendants") 
appeal their sentences after pleading guilty to conspiracy, 
theft, and receipt of cultural objects from a museum in 
Philadelphia. On appeal, defendants contend that the 
government violated the plea agreement and that the 
District Court misapplied the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines. For the reasons explained below, we conclude 
that the government satisfied its obligations under the plea 
agreement but that the District Court erred in applying the 
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sentencing guidelines. We therefore vacate defendants' 




The Historical Society of Pennsylvania ("HSP"), founded in 
1824 and located in Philadelphia, exhibits antiques and 
other historical items to the public. Defendant Medford 
worked as a custodian at the HSP for approximately 18 
years. During that time, he met defendant Csizmazia, a 
collector of antiques, who was working as a contractor at 
the HSP. The defendants agreed that Medford would steal 
items from the museum and sell them to Csizmazia. 
 
Over a ten-year period, Medford pilfered approximately 
200 valuable items from the museum, including a sword 
presented to George G. Meade for his military 
accomplishments during the Civil War, a 1735 gold snuff 
box presented to Andrew Hamilton for successfully 
defending J. Peter Zenger in his libel trial, a ring containing 
a lock of George Washington's hair, an ivory tea caddy that 
belonged to George Washington, a telescope used by Elisha 
Kent Kane during his 1853 exploration of the arctic region, 
lockets containing the hair of John Brown and Andrew 
Jackson, the wedding band of Patrick Henry's wife, a silver 
pitcher presented to a physician for his efforts during the 
1848 smallpox epidemic in Philadelphia, and a Lancaster 
County long rifle crafted in 1785 by Isaac Haines, one of 
Philadelphia's finest gunsmiths. For a paltry sum, Medford 
sold these items to Csizmazia, who concealed them at his 
residence. All of the items have been recovered. 
 
Defendants entered into a plea agreement under which 
the government promised to "[m]ake a motion to allow the 
District Court to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines 
pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines S 5K1.1, if the 
government in its sole discretion, determines that the 
defendant has provided substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another person who has 
committed an offense . . . ." Csizmazia App. at 24-25; 
Medford App. at 9-10. Defendants pleaded guilty to 
conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371; theft of objects 
of cultural heritage, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 668(b)(1); 
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and receipt and concealment of stolen objects of cultural 
heritage, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 668(b)(2).2 
 
At sentencing, the District Court applied U.S.S.G. 
S 2B1.1, which provides a base offense level of four for a 
variety of larceny offenses, including offenses committed 
under 18 U.S.C. S 668. The Court then enhanced 
defendants' base offense levels 15 points because the 
amount of loss sustained by the HSP exceeded $2.5 million. 
See U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1(b)(1)(P). In arriving at that figure, the 
District Court considered the appraisals proffered by the 
government. The experts who made the appraisals had 
determined that the total monetary value of the stolen 
items ranged between $2,452,471 and $2,579,500. Over 
the defendants' objection, the District Court selected the 
midpoint of the two estimates for a total loss of 
$2,515,985.50. The Court reasoned: "[I]t is entirely 
appropriate for the Court to accept a valuation . . . which 
is based upon two expert appraisals . . . and to utiliz[e] the 
midpoint range." Csizmazia App. at 72a; Medford App. at 
24. 
 
The Court next considered the government's section 
5K1.1 motion for a downward departure. The government 
declared that its section 5K1.1 motion merely granted the 
District Court "permission" to depart downward, but that 
the government "certainly [did not] recommend a downward 
departure." See Csizmazia App. at 81a; Medford App. at 33. 
Specifically, the government stated: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. 18 U.S.C. S 668(b) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       Any person who- 
 
       (1) steals or obtains by fraud from the care, custody, or control 
of 
       a museum any object of cultural heritage; or 
 
       (2) knowing that an object of cultural heritage has been stolen or 
       obtained by fraud, if in fact the object was stolen or obtained 
from 
       the care, custody, or control of a museum (whether or not that 
       fact is known to the person), receives, conceals, exhibits, or 
       disposes of the object, 
 
       shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, 
       or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 668(b)(1), (2). 
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       [T]he motion for downward departure . . . permits the 
       Court to depart downward. . . . [T]hat's what the 
       Government is saying, you're permitted, I'm not 
       granting you permission, but under the rules it 
       provides that I'm giving you discretion [to depart 
       downward based on defendants' substantial assistance] 
       . . . . [W]e told both counsel that we wouldfile a weak 
       5K. And a weak 5K in our opinion is [one that] grants 
       discretion to depart downwards, but we certainly don't 
       recommend a downward departure. 
 
Csizmazia App. at 83a; Medford App. at 35. The District 
Court denied the motion. 
 
The District Court heard victim impact testimony from 
the President of the HSP, Susan Stiff ("Stiff "). See 
Csizmazia App. at 106a-108a; Medford App. at 58-60. Stiff 
explained that defendants' actions had damaged one of the 
museum's most important assets -- its reputation as a 
responsible steward of important national treasures-- "in 
ways that cannot be quantified." Csizmazia App. at 107a; 
Medford App. at 59. Stiff noted that the damage caused by 
defendants could decrease financial contributions, reduce 
donations of valuable historical objects, and diminish the 
HSP's ability to attract qualified individuals to serve as 
trustees and staff members. See Csizmazia App. at 106a- 
107a; Medford App. at 58-59. Because of the harm caused 
to the HSP and the public, Stiff implored the District Court 
to "to impose the heaviest possible sentence on both 
defendants." Csizmazia App. at 107a-108a; Medford App. at 
59-60. The government concurred. Csizmazia App. at 108a; 
Medford App. at 60. 
 
Finding that the defendants' sentencing range of 27 to 33 
months did not "sufficiently encompass[ ] the egregiousness 
of the offenses that were involved," the District Court 
departed upward four levels from the guidelines. Csizmazia 
App. at 109a; Medford App. at 61. However, the Court did 
not advise the defendants prior to the sentencing hearing 
that it intended to depart upward. 
 
The District Court sentenced the defendants to 48 
months of imprisonment, and the defendants took this 
appeal. Defendants claim that the government (1) violated 
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the plea agreement by filing a motion for downward 
departure and then stating at the sentencing hearing that 
it did not recommend departure and (2) acted in bad faith 
by failing to make "a more concerted 5K1.1 downward 
departure motion at the time of sentencing." Csizmazia Br. 
at 15. Defendants also contend that the District Court 
misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines by (1) arbitrarily 
selecting the middle value of the high and low estimates of 
the fair market value of the stolen items as the amount of 
loss sustained by the HSP; (2) departing upward without 
providing sufficient advance notice of its intentions; (3) 
departing upward on a ground that had already been taken 
into consideration by the Guidelines; and (4) departing 
upward four levels without articulating its reason for the 




Defendants contend that the government violated the 
plea agreement by filing a downward departure motion and 
then stating at the sentencing hearing that it did not 
recommend a downward departure. Defendants also claim 
that the government acted in bad faith by failing to make "a 
more concerted 5K1.1 downward departure motion at the 
time of sentencing." Csizmazia Br. at 15.3 As a remedy, 
defendants seek a remand for resentencing before a 
different judge. "Whether the Government violated a plea 
agreement is a question of law subject to de novo review." 
See United States v. Huang, 178 F.3d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 
1999) (citing United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136, 142 (3d 
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 722 (1998)). We reject 
defendants' claims. 
 
Section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines provides: 
 
       Upon motion of the government stating that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Defendants' contention that the government violated the plea 
agreement by requesting the court to impose the heaviest sentence 
possible on the defendants is frivolous. In the plea agreement, the 
government reserved the right to "[m]ake whatever sentencing 
recommendation the government deems appropriate. . .." Csizmazia 
App. at 25; Medford App. at 10. 
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       defendant has provided substantial assistance in the 
       investigation or prosecution of another person who has 
       committed an offense, the court may depart from the 
       guidelines. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1. We have held that, in the absence of two 
circumstances not present here, a District Court may not 
depart below the guideline range based on a defendant's 
substantial assistance unless the government makes a 
motion to permit such a departure. See United States v. 
Abuhouran, 161 F.3d 206, 211-212 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1479 (1999). 
 
In this case, the plea agreement required the government 
"to mak[e] a motion to allow the Court to depart from the 
Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines 
S 5K1.1, if the government, in its sole discretion, determines 
that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in 
the investigation or prosecution of another person who has 
committed an offense. . . ." Csizmazia App. at 24-25 
(emphasis added); Medford App. at 9-10. We interpret the 
plain terms of the plea agreement to require only that the 
government file a S 5K1.1 motion in order to give the 
District Court the power ("to allow the Court") to depart 
downward under that provision. Contrary to defendants' 
suggestions, the plea agreement did not require the 
government to recommend a downward departure at the 
sentencing hearing; nor did it prohibit the government from 
stating at the sentencing hearing that it did not recommend 
departure. Therefore, when the government filed the 5K1.1 
motion, it complied with the terms of the plea agreement.4 
 
In addition, we find no basis for the defendants' 
contention that the government acted in bad faith by failing 
to make "a more concerted 5K1.1 downward departure 
motion at the time of sentencing." Csizmazia Br. at 15. In 
making this contention, defendants cite United States v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It is true that the plea agreement could have been more explicit in 
stating that, while the government was obligated to make a S 5K1.1 
motion, the government was reserving the right to take whatever 
recommendation it chose as to whether a downward departure should be 
granted. In future cases, it would be advisable for the government to 
make this point explicit. 
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Isaac, 141 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 1998), in which we held that 
the government's failure to file a 5K1.1 motion as required 
under the plea agreement must not result from bad faith. 
Defendants' reliance on Isaac, however, is misplaced. Here, 
the government filed a S 5K1.1 motion and in so doing 
complied with its obligation under the plea agreement. 
Accordingly, we fail to perceive any bad faith on the 
government's part. 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the government 
satisfied its obligation under the plea agreement and that 
the government's actions were not in bad faith. We 





Defendants also contend that the District Court erred in 
enhancing their base offense levels because it arbitrarily 
selected the midpoint between the high and low estimates 
of the stolen items' fair market value as the amount of loss 
sustained by the HSP and stated, without further 
explanation, that doing so is "entirely appropriate."5 We 
review the District Court's findings for clear error. See 
United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3d Cir. 1993). 
We agree with defendants. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1 establishes a defendant's base offense 
level for offenses involving theft of property. See U.S.S.G. 
S 2B1.1 (1997). For offenses under 18 U.S.C.S 668, the 
defendant's base offense level begins at four and is 
increased depending on the amount of the loss sustained 
as a result of the illegal conduct. See U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1(a), 
(b)(1). In determining the amount of loss sustained, courts 
are instructed to ascertain the fair market value of the 
stolen items. See U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1, commentary n.2. We 
have held that in cases in which the fair market value 
ranges between two estimates and either end of the range 
is equally plausible, courts generally should adopt the lower 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Had the District Court selected the lower estimate, the defendants 
would have received a 14-level increase in their base offense levels, 
rather than the 15-level increase that they received. 
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end of the estimated range. See Miele, 989 F.2d at 665-66 
(citing United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th 
Cir. 1990). However, "where there is other evidence to 
support the higher end of an estimated range, the court 
may certainly rely on the higher estimate." Miele, 989 F.2d 
at 665-66. Such other evidence must be supported by 
"sufficient indicia of reliability," and the court must explain 
on the record why it relied on the estimate at the higher 
end. Id. at 668 ("We require that the district court articulate 
more than a conclusory finding . . . . The district court may 
not rest its decision upon facts until it determines that the 
fact or facts have sufficient indicia of reliability to support 
a conclusion that they are probably accurate."). 
 
The decision of the District Court violates Miele. In 
determining that the fair market value of the stolen items 
exceeded $2.5 million, the District Court selected the 
middle value of the high and low estimates without 
assessing the reliability of the higher estimate. In addition, 
the District Court did not articulate an adequate 
evidentiary basis for selecting the middle value of the two 
estimates, as opposed to selecting the low end of the range. 
Accordingly, as the government requests, we vacate the 
defendants' sentences and remand for resentencing in 




Defendants further maintain that remand is required 
under Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138 (1991), 
because the District Court departed upward without 
providing advance notice to the defendants of its intention 
to upwardly depart. We agree. In Burns, the Supreme Court 
held: 
 
       Before a district court can depart upward on a ground 
       not identified as a ground for upward departure either 
       in the presentence report or in a prehearing 
       submission by the Government, Rule 32 [of the Federal 
       Rules of Criminal Procedure] requires that the district 
       court give the parties reasonable notice that it is 
       contemplating such a ruling. 
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Id.; see also United States v. Barr, 963 F.2d 641, 655 (3d 
Cir. 1992). The government recognizes that the District 
Court "did not provide the defense with sufficient advance 
notice of [its] intention to upwardly depart from the 
guidelines," and therefore it concedes that the District 
Court committed plain error. Appellee's Br. at 9. In light of 
Burns and the position taken by the government, we vacate 
the sentences imposed by the District Court and remand 
for resentencing. 
 
Although we are remanding to the District Court, we will 
address one further issue relating to the upward departure 
that was briefed to us here and that no doubt will be raised 
on remand. Defendants contend that the District Court's 
upward departure was improper because the cultural value 
of the stolen objects is an element of 18 U.S.C.S 668 
already taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Guidelines. We review the District Court's findings of fact 
for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See United 
States v. Hillstrom, 988 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir. 1993). We 
reject defendants' argument. 
 
As noted above, S 2B1.1 provides for increases in the 
defendants' sentence depending upon the amount of loss 
sustained by the victim of the offense. See U.S.S.G. 
S 2B1.1, background commentary ("The value of property 
stolen plays an important role in determining sentences for 
theft and other offenses involving stolen property because it 
is an indicator of both the harm to the victim and the 
gain to the defendant."). In making this determination, 
the Guidelines instruct the courts to ascertain the fair 
market value of the stolen items. See U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1, 
commentary n.2. The application notes recognize, however, 
that in some cases, the monetary loss will not "fully capture 
the harmfulness of the conduct." See U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1, 
commentary n.15. In those cases, the application notes 
provide that "an upward departure may be warranted." Id. 
 
In this case, after enhancing the defendants' offense level 
by 15 based on the fair market value of the stolen items, 
the District Court departed upward four levels because the 
applicable sentencing range did not "sufficiently encompass 
the egregiousness of the offenses that were involved here." 
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Csizmazia App. at 109a; Medford App. at 61. The Court 
explained: 
 
       [T]he conduct that [the defendants] engaged in is an 
       assault and affront to our culture, to our society, and 
       . . . must be dealt with accordingly. [T]he intangibles 
       . . . involved . . . and the effects that they have . . . had 
       upon the institution itself -- both here in Philadelphia 
       and . . . throughout the country -- mandate that the 
       court . . . issue an upward departure in this case. 
 
Csizmazia App. at 109a-110a; Medford App. at 61-62. 
 
We agree with the District Court. The price set by the 
commercial market is insufficient to "fully capture the 
harmfulness of the [defendants'] conduct." The antiques 
stolen in this case unquestionably have historical and 
cultural importance. Moreover, the thefts affected the HSP 
in ways different in kind from a loss of money or other 
easily replaceable property, for these thefts damaged the 
HSP's reputation. In addition, the monetary value of these 
objects does not adequately take into consideration the real 
but intangible harm inflicted upon all of the other victims 
of the offense, including the City of Philadelphia and the 
general public. Because section 2B1.1 applies to thefts that 
cause financial harm to the immediate victim of the offense, 
the non-monetary damage caused here and the harm 
inflicted upon the public at large justify the District Court's 
upward departure. 
 
The defendants contend that the upward departure was 
impermissible because "the Sentencing Commission, in 
setting the offense level . . . for theft of objects of cultural 
heritage, took into account the very fact that the items 
stolen were items of cultural heritage." Medford Br. at 13. 
This argument, however, fails to take Application Note 15 
into account and overlooks the fact that U.S.S.G.S 2B1.1 
applies to a variety of theft offenses that do not involve 
objects of cultural heritage. To take just one example, 
U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1 applies to the offense of transporting 
stolen motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2312. Thus, under U.S.S.G. 
S 2B1.1, a defendant who transports stolen motor vehicles 
valued at $x across state lines is treated the same as a 
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defendant who steals objects of cultural heritage having the 
same fair market value. Because U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1 does not 
take into account the non-monetary significance of objects 
of cultural heritage, a departure may be warranted, as 
Application Note 15 suggests. 
 
Finally, defendants contend that the District Court erred 
in failing to explain its reason for a four-level upward 
departure. Because we are remanding to the District Court, 
we note only that the District Court should state on the 
record its reason for the extent of the departure. See United 




Accordingly, we vacate the defendants' sentences and 
remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. 
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